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1 Introduction
With the recent enlargement of the European Union there is now a sizeable number of countries
bordering the euro area who are facing a complex question on their future monetary policy. In
the longer term, the question will be whether these countries should adopt the euro or conduct
an independent monetary policy as Sweden and Great Britain have been doing with considerable
success. Recent papers on the optimality of currency areas versus independent monetary policies
include Benigno and Benigno (2000) and Benigno (2004).
Yet, it remains an open question how long the new eu members would have to wait before
they could fully join the monetary union. Arguably, they could be in a waiting position for years
where they will be pegging the euro and thus essentially be passively adopting the monetary policy
conducted by the ecb. Thus, it would be of general interest to seek to quantify the welfare
consequences of pegging the euro compared with an independent monetary policy regime. Due to
the combination of dramatic changes in their economies over the last decade and a very limited set
of time series on key aggregate measures, obtaining reliable estimates on the welfare implications
of diﬀerent monetary policy regimes for the new eu members from central and eastern Europe is,
alas, a very diﬃcult task.
Incidentally, Denmark oﬀers an interesting case study on this exact question. Although a
member of the erm for years, Denmark has opted out of the third stage of the emu for political
reasons (which mainly has to do with an eu-skeptic population). As a consequence, Denmark
has eﬀectively had a fixed exchange-rate policy for decades now; thus, since 1987 the monetary
policy has kept a constant parity on the D-mark/euro. This paper seeks to quantify the welfare
implications of this peg regime compared with a hypothetical independent monetary policy regime
which seeks to stabilise inflation and output volatility. Thus, since the Danes have twice rejected
to adopt the euro, this paper provides an answer to the question of which alternative monetary
policy is the optimal one.
In order to address this question, we formulate a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (dsge)
model for the Danish economy and calculate a second-order approximation around its steady state.
We have chosen this solution method since first-order approximations are not adequate for welfare
analysis of stochastic models, cf. Kim and Kim (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
The model itself builds on the one presented in Kollmann (2002). However, while Kollmann
bases his welfare analysis on a calibration of the structural parameters of his model, we rely on
the model that was estimated on Danish data in Dam and Linaa (2005). This model makes three
important departures from the one in Kollmann (2002). Firstly, in the fixed-exchange rate case
we do not consider a peg that is perfect; instead we postulate that the central bank is only able
to keep the exchange rate stable up to an exogenous shock, reflecting the (minor) fluctuations
observed in the exchange rate around its parity. Secondly, we replace Kollmann’s assumption of a
competitive labour market with one of diﬀerentiated labour and monopolistic competition amongst
the households leading them to raise wages above the competitive level; in addition, we impose
wage rigidities a la Calvo (1983) by assuming that households are unable to revise their wage
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demands every period. Thirdly, we generalise the utility function applied in Kollmann (2002) so
that the key elasticities as well as habits reflecting household preferences are estimated. All in all,
the model underlying our analysis has richer dynamics which ceteris paribus improves its empirical
plausibility. This should fascilitate the reliability of the quantitative welfare cost that we deduce
in this paper.
There are potentially important matters not included in the current analysis; if Denmark decided
to adopt a Taylor rule, risk aversion from foreign investors might induce a reduction in direct
investment flows into Denmark caused by an increased uncertainty regarding the exchange rate.
Furthermore, also Danish exporters face uncertainty regarding the exchange rate and could need to
engage in costly arrangements with financial intermediaries in order to eliminate this uncertainty
when trading with agents abroad. Finally, we ignore issues related to the potential budget discipline
being put on the Government in order to keep a peg credible.
Abstaining from these issues we conclude that there are benefits to be attained from letting
monetary policy be conducted according to a Taylor rule (cf. Taylor, 1993; Woodford, 2003) instead
of maintaining the peg which is the current goal of Danish monetary policy. Our estimate suggests
that the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent increase of 0.8 pct in the level of consumption.
The optimal Taylor rule is found to be characterised by attaching a weight of 3 (which is the ceiling
of our grid search) to inflation and a weight of 0.8 on output growth. Contrary to Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004b) we do not find it beneficial for the central bank to smooth interest rates over
time.
With regards to the causes of the higher level of welfare under the Taylor rule, we obtain mixed
results: in terms of consumption, the higher welfare is founded in the higher mean of consumption
under the Taylor rule, although the volatility of consumption has also increased. For labour this
result is reverted; under the peg regime labour is more volatile than under the Taylor rule, while
the mean is predicted to be lower under the peg. Overall, agents prefer the higher consumption,
despite higher volatility and more labour eﬀorts.
Two related studies are Ambler et al. (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a). Ambler
et al. (2003) apply maximum-likelihood techniques to estimate a dsge model without capital of
a small open economy and search for the optimal Taylor rule. They do not, however, consider a
fixed exchange-rate regime, as the benchmark model in their study is a Taylor rule estimated on
Canadian data. They obtain the result that the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent increase
of 1.4 pct in the level of consumption compared with the level of welfare under the historical Taylor
rule. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) analyse the closed-economy model laid out and estimated
by Christiano et al. (2001). Contrary to existing studies, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) find
that inflation should be attached a value of just 1, giving room for what they style “a significant
degree of optimal inflation volatility”. This is explained by the presence of indexation to past
inflation.
This paper goes on as follows: In Section 2 the model is laid out, and in Section 3 it is
parameterised. In Section 4 the welfare measure and the solution method is being described and
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in Section 5 we use this to find the optimal Taylor rule. In Section 6 the results are presented and
in Section 7 we analyse the robustness of the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
The model is basically identical to the one used by Dam and Linaa (2005) which again draws
heavily on the model presented in Kollmann (2002). Like him, we consider a small open economy
that produces a continuum of intermediate goods which are aggregated and sold under imperfect
competition to final-good producers at home and abroad. Producers of intermediaries only reop-
timise prices infrequently a la Calvo (1983), but can diﬀerentiate fully between the domestic and
foreign market and price their goods abroad in the local currency. It follows that prices are sticky
in the currency of the buyer, an assumption that has been forcefully argued by, e.g., Betts and
Devereux (1996, 2000). Recently, Bergin (2003, 2004) has compared local and producer currency
pricing in estimated dsge models and found strong empirical support for local currency pricing.
Final goods are produced from aggregates of the intermediate goods from home and abroad and
sold in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, all trade takes place in intermediary goods.
We replace the homogenous and perfectly competitive labour market of Kollmann (2002) with
one of diﬀerentiated labour services and rigid wage setting due to Erceg et al. (2000) and Kollmann
(2001) which was also implemented in the Christiano et al. (2001) model (henceforth the cee
model). Furthermore, we follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and assume crra preferences and
external habit formation; thus, the preferences analysed in Kollmann’s model are a special case
of ours. We maintain, however, the quadratic investment adjustment costs in the relative level of
capital, the debt premium on the interest earned on foreign bonds and the uip shock from the
Kollmann (2002) model. Finally, we introduce an imperfect peg regime for monetary policy with a
persistent policy shock.
An important deviation from Dam and Linaa (2005) is that in this paper we treat mark-up rates
as constants rather than allowing them to follow a stochastic process. The reason is a technicality;
our method of obtaining a second-order approximation requires that we write the non-linear system
as a multivariate first-order expectational diﬀerence equation. To our knowledge it is not possible
to write a model with stochastically varying markups in this form, and thus we introduce constant
markups. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) made an equivalent simplification when they considered
optimal monetary policy in the cee model.
In this section we outline the various components of the model.1
2.1 Households
Like Erceg et al. (2000) we assume a continuum with unity mass of symmetric households who
obtain utility from consumption of the final good and disutility from labour eﬀorts. Thus, they are
1A technical appendix with a thorough derivation of the model is available upon request.
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all characterized by the following preferences:
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtU (C∗t (j) , lt (j))
#
, (1)
U (C∗t , lt (j)) = ζ
b
t
"
C∗t (j)
1−σC
1− σC
− ζLt
lt (j)
1+σL
1 + σL
#
, σC , σL > 0
where ζbt represents a shock to the discount rate and ζ
L
t represents a shock to the labour sup-
ply, while the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σC is also the inverse intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and σL represents the inverse Frisch labour supply elasticity; finally, j ∈ [0, 1] signi-
fies the household. We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and assume external habit formation in
consumption; that is, utility is obtained from
C∗t (j) = Ct (j)− hCt−1, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, (2)
where hCt−1 is the habit stock at time t which is external in the sense that it is proportional to
the past aggregate consumption level that is considered exogenous to the individual household. We
further assume a security market where households completely diversify their individual income
uncertainty, so that consumption is equalised across households; Ct (j) = Ct, ∀j.
Each household supplies an idiosyncratic variety of labour service lt (j). These labour services
enter as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in the intermediate-goods firm production; thus, letting lt (s, j)
be the amount of labour service j utilized by firm s we find that firm s uses the following amount
of composite labour services;
Lt (s) =
∙Z 1
0
lt (s, j)
1
1+γ dj
¸1+γ
, γ > 1, (3)
where γ turns out to be the net wage markup.
As was the case of intermediary prices, wage setting is staggered a la Calvo (1983). That is,
in each period household j only optimizes its wage wt (j) with probability 1 −D. The household
takes the average wage rate Wt =
hR 1
0 wt (j)
− 1
1+γt dj
i−(1+γt)
as given when it chooses its optimal
wage wt,t and will meet any demand for the given type of labour;2
lt (j) =
Z 1
0
lt (s, j) ds. (4)
In addition to consumption, households can invest in domestic and foreign one-period bonds
as well as in domestic capital. Capital Kt earns rental rate Rt and accumulates as follows with δ
2Note that the optimal wage in any period is identical across households, which is the reason why wt,t can be
written without index j.
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measuring depreciation;
Kt+1 = Kt (1− δ) + It −
Φ
2
(Kt+1 −Kt)2
Kt
, 0 < δ < 1, Φ > 0, (5)
where It is investment. Here, we have followed Kollmann (2002) and assumed quadratic adjustment
costs. Domestic bonds At earns net interest it, while the interest i
f
t accruing to foreign bonds Bt held
by domestic agents deviates from the exogenously given foreign interest level i∗t as follows;³
1 + ift
´
= Ωt (1 + i
∗
t ) , (6)
Ωt = υt exp
½
−λetBt+1
PtΞ
¾
, Ξ =
eP xQx
P
, (7)
where et is the nominal exchange rate and Pt is the price of final goods, while Ξ is the steady-state
value of export in units of the domestic final good. Thus, the interest on foreign bonds is growing
in the foreign debt level which ensures the existence of a unique equilibrium, cf. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003), while υt is a stochastic i.i.d. shock which we motivate with the empirically
observed departure from the uncovered interest parity. We style υt a uip shock but abstain from
a deeper explanation of its nature; Bergin (2004) oﬀers a good discussion of uip shocks in the new
open-economy macroeconomic (noem) literature.
Households own equal shares of domestic firms and thus earn profit from the intermediate-
goods firms (∆t (j)) in addition to rental rates Rt on the capital, wage income from their labour
services and payments from their state-contingent securities (St (j)). Hence, the budget constraint
of household j is
At+1 (j) + etBt+1 (j) + Pt (Ct (j) + It (j)) = (8)
At (j) (1 + it−1) + etBt (j)
³
1 + ift−1
´
+RtKt (j) +∆t (j) + wt (j) lt (j) + St (j) .
Thus, households decide their consumption, wages and investments in accordance with the
solution to the following problem;
max
{Ct(j),At+1(j),Bt+1(j),Kt+1(j),wt,t}∞t=0
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtU (C∗t (j) , lt (j))
#
,
s.t. (1)-(8).
The first-order conditions for domestic and foreign bonds yield regular Euler conditions;
(1 + it)Et
£
ρt,t+1
¤
= 1, (9)³
1 + ift
´
Et
∙
ρt,t+1
et+1
et
¸
= 1, (10)
ρt,τ ≡ βτ (UC,τ/UC,t) (Pt/Pτ ) , UC,t ≡
∂U (C∗t , Lt)
∂Ct
, (11)
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where ρt,τ discounts profits at time τ . One should bear in mind, however, that in this case UC,t
depends on Ct−1 as well as Ct due to our assumption of external habits.
Having assumed that the household always meets demand for labour at its chosen wage level,
the optimal wage rate at time t is
wt,t =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
P
(Dβ)τ−tEt
∙
ζbtζ
L
t (1 + γ)W
1+γ
γ (1+σL)
τ L1+σLτ
¸
P
(Dβ)τ−tEt
∙
UC,τ
Pτ
W
1+γ
γ
τ Lτ
¸
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
γ
γ+(1+γ)σL
.
where Wt is the aggregate wage level determined as
Wt =
h
D (Wt−1)
− 1γ + (1−D) (wt,t)−
1
γ
i−γ
.
Thus, the infrequent reoptimisation implies that households must consider expectations of all future
wage levels and labour supplies when they set their optimal wage.
2.2 Final Goods
Final goods Zt are produced using intermediate-good bundles from home
¡
Qdt
¢
and abroad (Qmt )
respectively. These intermediary aggregates are combined with a Cobb Douglas technology;
Zt =
µ
Qdt
αd
¶αd µ
Qmt
αm
¶αm
, αd + αm = 1.
Each bundle of intermediate goods is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate, where v turns out to be the net
markup rate;
Qit =
∙Z 1
0
qi (s)
1
1+ν ds
¸1+ν
, i = d,m.
Assuming that domestic firms face the problem of minimizing the cost of producing Zt units of
the final good, demands for goods produced domestically and abroad can be written as
Qit = α
i Pt
P it
Zt, i = d,m,
Pt =
³
P dt
´αd
(Pmt )
αm ,
where the appropriately defined price index Pt is the marginal cost of the final-goods producing
firm. With perfect competition in the final-goods market, Pt is also the price of one unit of the
final consumption good.
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2.3 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced from labour Lt and capital Kt using Cobb-Douglas technology.
Thus, the production function of firm s is
yt (s) = θtKt (s)
ψ Lt (s)
1−ψ , 0 < ψ < 1,
where θt is the exogenously given aggregate level of technology. Producers operate in a monopolistic
competitive market, where each producer sets the price of her variety, taking other prices as given
and supplying whatever amount is demanded at the price set.
Firms rent capital at the rate Rt and compensate labour with wages Wt. Hence, any firm’s
marginal costs are
MCt =
1
θt
W 1−ψt R
ψ
t ψ
−ψ (1− ψ)−(1−ψ) . (12)
Producers sell their good variety to both domestic and foreign final-goods producers (that is,
yt (s) = qdt (s)+q
m
t (s)) and are able to price discriminate between the two markets. As is well-known
from the Dixit-Stiglitz models, final-good producers demand individual varieties of intermediaries
as follows
qit (s) =
µ
pit (s)
P it
¶− 1+νν
Qit, i = d,m,
and thereby firm profits can be written as
πdx
³
pdt (s) , p
x
t (s)
´
=
³
pdt (s)−MCt
´
qdt (s) + (etp
x
t (s)−MCt) qxt (s) .
We furthermore assume that foreign exporters produce at unit costs equivalent to the aggregate
foreign price level P ∗t and thus generate the following profits in the domestic market;
πm (pmt (s)) = (p
m
t (s)− etP ∗t )
µ
pmt (s)
Pmt
¶− 1+νν
Qmt .
Demands from foreign final-goods producers are assumed to be of the Dixit-Stiglitz form as
well;
qxt (s) =
µ
pxt (s)
P xt
¶− 1+νν
Qxt , Q
x
t =
µ
P xt
P ∗t
¶
Y ∗t ,
where the foreign aggregates P ∗t , Y
∗
t are exogenous.
As in the case of wages, we follow Calvo (1983) and assume that a firm only reoptimises its
prices in any given period with probability 1 − d. Given that domestic firms seek to maximise
profits discounted with a pricing kernel based on household utility (cf. equation (11)), a firm that
reoptimises its domestic price faces the following problem;
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pdt,t = argmax
ω
∞X
τ=t
dτ−tEt
h
ρt,τπ
dx (ω, pxt (s))
i
,
As firms set prices in the domestic and foreign market separately, the constant marginal costs —
cf. equation (12) — imply that the two price setting problems are independent. Hence, the optimal
price pdt,t is determined from the following first-order condition;
pdt,t = (1 + ν)
P∞
τ=t d
τ−tEt
h
ρt,τ
¡
P dτ
¢ 1+ν
ν Qdt+τMCτ
i
P∞
τ=t d
τ−tEt
h
ρt,τ (P dτ )
1+ν
ν Qdτ
i .
Import firms are owned by risk-neutral foreigners who discount future profits at the foreign
nominal interest rate Rt,τ ≡ Πτ−1s=t (1 + i∗s)
−1. Thus, they set their prices in order to maximize
discounted future profits measured in foreign currency;
pmt,t = argmax
ω
∞X
τ=t
dτ−tEt [Rt,τπ
m (ω) /eτ ]
which again implies a condition for the optimal price pmt,t similar to that for p
d
t,t.
Finally, the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz prices of the intermediate goods are as follows;
P it =
∙
d
¡
P it−1
¢− 1ν + (1− d) ¡pit,t¢− 1ν ¸−ν , i = d,m, x.
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
All intermediaries are demanded from either domestic or foreign final goods producers, while fi-
nal goods can either be consumed or invested in capital. Hence, equilibria in the markets for
intermediate and final goods require
Yt = Qdt +Q
x
d,
Zt = Ct + It. (13)
Turning to the capital market, aggregate demand for capital is
Kt =
Z 1
0
Kt (s) ds =
1
θt
µ
ψ
1− ψ
Wt
Rt
¶1−ψ h
qdt (s) + q
x
t (s)
i
,
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and, hence, equilibrium in the capital market (Kt = Kt) implies
Kt =
1
θt
µ
ψ
1− ψ
Wt
Rt
¶1−ψ ⎡
⎣
µPdt
P dt
¶− 1+νν
Qdt +
µPxt
P xt
¶− 1+νν
Qxt
⎤
⎦ ,
where we introduce
Pit ≡
∙Z 1
0
¡
pit
¢− 1+νν ¸− ν1+ν , i = d, x.
Under the assumptions of the Calvo pricing model, these indices of individual prices evolve as
follows;
P it =
∙
d
¡Pit−1¢− 1+νν + (1− d) ¡pit,t¢− 1+νν ¸− ν1+ν , i = d, x.
Finally, we assume that only domestic agents hold the domestic bond, implying that At = 0 in
equilibrium.
Aggregating and manipulating the household budget constraint (8) and using the final-good
market equilibrium (13) yields the following equation which simply states that the net foreign
assets position (nfa) changes with accruing interest and the net export.
etBt+1 + Pt (Ct + It) = etBt
³
1 + ift−1
´
+RtKt +WtLt
+P dt Q
d
t + etP
x
t Q
x
t − (RtKt +WtLt)⇒
Bt+1 = Bt
³
1 + ift−1
´
+ P xt Q
x
t −
Pmt
et
Qmt .
2.5 Monetary Policy
We have two monetary policy regimes to consider. The first one is a peg regime, as presented in
Dam and Linaa (2005), and the second one is a regime in which the central bank conducts monetary
policy according to a Taylor rule, first suggested by Taylor (1993) and thoroughly discussed in, e.g.,
Woodford (2003).
With regards to the peg regime, we postulate that it is impossible for the central bank to keep
the exchange rate fully fixed. This is motivated from noting that although the Danish central bank
successfully has been able to keep the Danish krone stable vis-a-vis its anchor, minor movements
in the exchange rate of first D-mark and then (to a lesser extent) the euro has occured. Hence,
we assume that the central bank can keep the exchange rate fixed around its parity (equal to the
steady state value) up to a multiplicative exogenous policy shock ξpegt with unity mean;
et = eξ
peg
t .
We assume that ξpegt = (
mξpegt−1 + ε
m
peg,t where ε
m
peg,t is a Gaussian innovation with mean 0 and
standard deviation σmpeg, and 0 ≤ (m < 1 is the policy error autocorrelation. The intuition of
this policy is clearest if we combine it with the Euler equations (9)-(10) and the equations (6)-(7)
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describing the wedge on the international interest rate and perform a log-linearisation around the
steady state. Then we obtain the following equation for the domestic interest rate;
ıˆt = ıˆ∗t +
³
υˆt − λBˆt
´
+Et∆ξˆ
peg
t+1,
where hats indicate a relative deviations from the steady state with proper normalisations.3 Thus,
the interest rate responds (virtually) one-to-one with the foreign interest rate and the uip shock.
Furthermore, a positive spread between the foreign and domestic interest rates emerges as the net
foreign position of the domestic country becomes negative et vice versa. Besides being intuitively
appealing, the debt premium also ensures the existence of a unique deterministic steady state.
The alternative Taylor rule is discussed in Section 5 below.
3 Parameterisation
To perform a quantitative welfare analysis and to produce impulse-response functions we need to
assign values to the parameters in the model. In Dam and Linaa (2005) we estimated the model
using a Bayesian estimation technique; that is, we used the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood
of a log-linearised version of the model and combined that information with our prior assumptions
on the structural parameters in order to obtain the posterior estimates. However, since we had
to lave the markup rates as constants in this analysis as discussed above, we necessarily have to
deviate from the estimation results obtained in that paper. Before justifying the values chosen for
the parameters we begin by summarising the parameterisation in Table 1.
Regarding preferences, these posterior estimates imply a labor supply (Frisch) elasticity of
approximately one and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of a half. Thus, our labour
supply elasticity is in accordance with a rich body of microeconometric findings, yet in the lower
range of the values typically used in the rbc literature. The estimate for the external habit stock
h lies between one third and a half; this is on the lower side compared with the literature at large,
but should be uncontroversial.
The estimated Calvo parameters imply that prices and wages are updated every four years and
one year, respectively. While the latter is plausible, the former implies an implausibly high degree
of price rigidity. We discuss potential causes of this puzzling finding in Dam and Linaa (2005) and
we return to its implication for the welfare analysis in Section 7.
As mentioned, a diﬀerence between the current peg model and the model presented in Dam and
Linaa (2005) is the absence of stochastic movements in the mark-up rates in this paper. Hence, we
have fixed γ and ν at the values used as means in the markup processes in Dam and Linaa (2005).
In that paper we also obtained a value of σL which was very high; we have thus attached a new
value to this parameter based on obtaining a predicted standard deviation of Yt (in the peg model)
that approximately matches that of its empirical counterpart, gdp.
3We refer the reader to Dam and Linaa (2005) for the exact details of a log-linearisation of the model.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
αd Share of domestic intermediaries in final prod. 0.7
β Discount factor 0.99
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
ψ Capital share 0.33
λ Capital mobility parameter 0.0019
d Calvo, intermediaries 0.941
D Calvo, wages 0.770
h Habit persistence 0.433
σC Household inverse ies 1.709
σL Inverse Frisch elasticity 1.032
Φ Capital adj. cost 14.422
ν Wage markup 0.2
γ Price markup 0.2
Shocks, persistence
(b Discount rate 0.825
(l Labor supply 0.962
(t Technology 0.824
(m Peg 0.899
(i Foreign interest rate 0.877
(P Foreign price level 0.925
(Y Foreign gdp 0.912
Shocks, volatility
σb Discount rate 0.041
σl Labor supply 0.0295
σt × 100 Technology 1.073
σU × 100 uip 0.342
σmpeg × 100 Peg 0.739
σmTR Monetary policy shock (Taylor rule) 0.08
σi × 100 Foreign int. rate 0.102
σP × 100 Foreign price level 0.337
σY × 100 Foreign gdp 0.786
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Apart from this, and apart from the values of αd, β, δ, ψ, λ and η which were kept fixed in the
estimation of the model in Dam and Linaa (2005), we use the values obtained as modes in our
posterior distribution.
4 Welfare Measure and Solution Method
Our measure of welfare is the unconditional expectation of household utility;
E
∙Z 1
0
U
³
Ckt − hCkt−1, lkt (j)
´
dj
¸
,
where k refers to the particular policy rule. As discussed thoroughly in Kim et al. (2003), this
amounts to comparing welfare in the diﬀerent stochastic steady states associated with each mone-
tary policy rule under consideration; hence, this measure implicitly disregards any welfare eﬀects
stemming from the transition between the initial state of the economy and the stochastic steady
state under the considered rule.
Integrating utility over the households is unproblematic with respect to consumption as we
have assumed a security market that equates consumption across them, cf. Subsection 2.1. Labour
supply, however, has not been smoothed between the households, and thus we need to pay attention
to the integral of the disutility of labour. Integrating over the disutility yields
Z 1
0
lt (j)
1+σL dj = L1+σLt
µWt
Wt
¶−1+γγ (1+σL)
,
where
Wt ≡
∙Z 1
0
wt (j)
− 1+γγ (1+σL) dj
¸− γ
(1+γ)(1+σL)
.
Due to the assumptions of the Calvo-like wage setting, this index of wage dispersion evolves as
follows;
Wt =
∙
DW−
1+γ
γ (1+σL)
t−1 + (1−D)w
−1+γγ (1+σL)
t,t
¸− γ
(1+γ)(1+σL)
.
Thus, the welfare measure can be cast as follows;
E
∙Z 1
0
U
³
Ckt − hCkt−1, lkt (j)
´
dj
¸
=
ζbt
1− σC
¡
Ct − hC¯t−1
¢1−σC − ζbtζLt
1 + σL
L1+σLt
µWt
Wt
¶− 1+γγ (1+σL)
.
Given the complexity of our non-linear model, an analytical solution is unattainable. Instead,
we obtain a second-order approximation with the dynare program.4 We have chosen this solution
method since first-order approximations are not adequate for welfare analysis of stochastic mod-
els. We refer the reader to Kim and Kim (2003) for an example of the inadequacy of first-order
4The dynare program is an ongoing project at cepremap and can be downloaded at
www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ where documentation is also available.
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approximations, and to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) for a thorough discussion of the merits
of second-order approximations.
Application of the dynare solution method requires that we write our model in the following
general from;
Et [Υt,Υt+1, εt, εt+1] = 0, (14)
where Υt is a vector of the endogenous variables of the model, while εt is a vector containing the
innovations to the structural shock processes.5 Thus we recast the model in the iterative form
of (14) where we also normalise all nominal variables with the price of domestic (or foreign) final
goods. The normalisation is carried out since the Taylor rule will only pin down the inflation rate,
not the price level, and we want to work with a stationary system. This version of the model is
summarised in Appendix A.6
5 Finding the Optimal Taylor Rule
Our alternative to the existing peg is an independent monetary policy rule belonging to the gen-
eralised family of Taylor rules. In particular, we restrict ourselves to the following variant of the
interest rule;
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)
µ
ρπ (Πt − 1) + ρy
µ
Yt
Yt−1
− 1
¶¶
+ ξTRt ,
where the ρ’s are the policy parameters which should be optimised to the economy in question,
while ξTRt is a Gaussian i.i.d. noise term reflecting monetary policy shocks. The standard deviation
of this shock cannot be estimated on Danish data since this monetary regime has never existed.
Instead the parameter σmTR is attached a value equal to 0.0008, which is the posterior mode estimate
found by Smets and Wouters (2003) on data for the euro area. We return to this issue in Section
7 below.
We perform a grid search of the policy parameters in the ranges ρi ∈ [0; 0.9] , ρπ ∈ [0; 3]
and ρy ∈ [0; 3]. We consider increments of 0.15 for the smoothing parameter ρi which is usually
introduced in order to capture empirically observed policy inertia; we include it in this normative
exercise, however, since smoothing can improve welfare in some cases as shown by Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004b). For ρπ and ρy we consider increments of 0.10. Thus, we solve the model for
6727 diﬀerent configurations of the Taylor rule.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) formulate three requirements to what they style operational
rules; they must (i) respond only to a limited set of readily observed variables; (ii) induce a locally
unique rational-expectations equilibrium; and (iii) satisfy the non-negativity constraint on nominal
interest rates. The first requirement is clearly fulfilled, as we only consider observed variables in
the rule in the form of realised levels or growth rates of overall inflation, gdp (and the nominal
exchange rate). In light of the controversy regarding the actual calculation of output gaps, we find
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c) for a presentation and derivation of the solution method we apply through
dynare.
6The transformation of the nominal model to real terms is documented in the technical appendix.
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Figure 1: Unconditional utility as a function of the Taylor rule parameters
that this restriction on the functional form of the rule is justified.7 To meet the second requirement
we only consider configurations of the rule that yield a determinate equilibrium in a radius of
0.2 of the parameters under consideration. This is done in order to avoid configurations close to
bifurcation points which tend to invalidate the welfare calculations, cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004b). Thirdly, we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and formulate the non-negativity
constraint indirectly through a condition that unconditional expectation of the interest rate should
be greater than twice its standard deviation (E [it] > 2σit). This requirement is fulfilled for both
the peg and the preferred Taylor rule regime.
We first consider the simple version of the Taylor rule, that is, one with no interest smoothing
(ρi = 0). The unconditional utility is shown as a function of the two policy rule parameters in
Figure 1.8 The maximum utility is obtained for the configuration
¡
ρπ, ρy
¢
= (3, 0.8).
Interestingly, the optimal rule does not change when we introduce interest smoothing. That
is, unconditional utility is maximised at
¡
ρπ, ρy, ρi
¢
= (3, 0.8, 0) which is illustrated in Figure 2.9
Hence, this rule will be the prefered one in the following section where we compare its merits with
7Here it could be argued that the central bank does not have information on Yt at time t when it is to choose
it. We acknowledge that, but defends our choice by claiming that the central bank should have a relatively reliable
forecast regarding Yt at time t.
8Configurations of the policy rule that implies a determinate equilibrium with E [U ] < −2.3 are assigned that
value in Figure 1 for instructive purposes. The calculations have suﬀered from numerical problems which we have
not been able to resolve. Thus, a few of the points have been obtained from interpolation from neighbourhood points
within an 0.03 radius. Details are available from the authors upon request.
9Configurations of the policy rule that implies a determinate equilibrium with E [U ] < −2.25 are assigned that
value in Figure 2 for instructive purposes. The remarks on interpolation in Footnote 8 also applies here.
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Figure 2: Unconditional utility and interest rate smoothing
those of a fixed exchange rate.
Woodford (2003) establishes the optimality of a Taylor rule in a model similar in spirit to the
one we have formulated. However, the optimality requires an output gap measure in the rule based
on an economy with no nominal rigidities, while ineﬃciencies in the economy are assumed to have
been eliminated through taxes and subsidies. Hence, optimality of our Taylor rule is unlikely in
a wider sense, and thus the welfare gains which we find from an independent monetary policy
compared with the existing peg regime only constitute a lower bound on the gains that could be
obtained. We do, however, believe that the familiarity and straightforward operationality of the
rules we consider is in itself an asset that motivates interest in this particular choice of monetary
policy.
6 Results
In this section we analyse the welfare implication of the two monetary policy regimes under con-
sideration as well as their causes.
6.1 Welfare
We measure the welfare gain of a Taylor rule over the existing peg regime through compensating
variation. That is, we calculate the relative permanent change in consumption that equates the
unconditional utility of households under the peg regime with that obtained under the optimal
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Taylor rule. Thus, the compensating variation of consumption is defined as the χ that solves the
following equation;
E
∙Z 1
0
U
¡
CTRt − hCTRt−1, lTRt (j)
¢
dj
¸
= E
∙Z 1
0
U
¡
(1 + χ)
¡
Cpegt − hC
peg
t−1
¢
, lpegt (j)
¢
dj
¸
.
Table 2: Welfare Analysis
Std. deviations (in pct) Peg Taylor
Y 2.85 3.36
C 3.22 4.99
I 7.03 10.75
L 4.25 4.09
i 0.44 0.19
Π 0.11 0.07
Means (in pct)
Y −0.64 −0.25
C −1.16 −0.44
I −1.26 0.06
L −0.11 −0.08
i −0.01 0.00
Π 0.00 0.00
Welfare equiv. χ (pct of C) 0.792
Note: All reported statistics are relative devi-
ations from the non-stochastic steady state.
We see from Table 2 that moving from a peg regime to one where the monetary policy is
set according to a Taylor rule results in a welfare improvement of 0.79 pct measured in units of
consumption goods. On the one hand, we note that although consumption is more volatile under
the Taylor regime compared with the peg, the level of consumption has increased. With regards
to labour supply this result is reverted; labour supply is more volatile under the peg than in the
Taylor rule regime, while the mean of labour supply is lower under the peg. Overall, the household
prefers the higher consumption under the Taylor regime even though they need to work more in
order to obtain this.
Contrary to Kollmann (2002) we find that volatility in output is higher under a Taylor rule than
under the peg. This observation is attributed the existence of the highly persistent labour supply
shock we consider in this paper. Decomposing the contribution from the shocks reveals the findings
reported in Table 3. As stressed by Dam and Linaa (2005), labour supply shocks are the overall
dominant source of fluctuations. To verify that this is indeed the main reason behind the increased
volatility of the Taylor rule regime compared with the peg, we ran both simulations under the
assumption that (L = 0.82 which is the autocorrelation estimated for the technology process. In
this case we obtained a standard deviation of output equaling 1.81 pct in the peg regime dropping
substantially to 1.00 pct under the Taylor regime, thus re-establishing the findings of Kollmann
(2002). In this scenario the welfare gain by leaving the peg and adopting a Taylor rule dropped to
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0.28 pct measured in units of consumption goods.
Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Variable Y C I L i Π
Preferences Peg 0.33 0.90 0.16 0.29 0.02 0.05
Taylor 0.05 0.28 1.26 0.04 1.54 1.71
Labour supply Peg 61.17 78.41 42.35 31.79 0.10 75.49
Taylor 93.97 90.16 81.47 56.31 55.70 48.03
Technology Peg 2.41 1.33 2.37 39.05 0.00 11.51
Taylor 0.54 0.15 0.60 41.83 34.18 41.19
uip Peg 0.41 0.14 1.56 0.42 62.04 0.02
Taylor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monetary policy Peg 13.57 11.72 28.89 10.20 15.73 0.43
Taylor 1.57 1.21 2.82 0.98 1.97 2.10
Foreign interest rate Peg 5.29 3.63 12.85 4.54 21.31 1.97
Taylor 0.18 0.14 0.44 0.12 0.50 0.46
Foreign price Peg 2.95 1.12 2.41 2.39 0.15 0.73
Taylor 0.06 0.17 0.96 0.09 0.86 0.86
Foreign demand Peg 13.86 2.75 9.41 11.34 0.65 9.79
Taylor 3.63 7.88 12.46 0.63 5.24 6.65
Note: All shares are in pct.
In Figure 3 we compare the unconditional utility as a function of the Taylor parameters
¡
ρπ, ρy
¢
with that obtained under the peg. We see that a rather large set of parameters of ρπ and ρy ensures
a level of utility that exceeds the level of utility under the peg.
6.2 Impulse-Response Functions
This section clarifies the important deviations between the economy in which monetary policy is
conducted according to a Taylor rule and one in which a constant nominal exchange rate is the
monetary policy target. In particular we seek to clarify why volatility in consumption is higher under
a Taylor rule than in the peg regime and why volatility in labour is lower. We do so by studying
the impulse-responses obtained from both models. Inspecting the consequences of a technological
shock, we see from Figure 4 that under the peg output initially drops. This phenomenon was
thoroughly analysed in Dam and Linaa (2005); the initial drop in output is a consequence of the
very rigid prices; recall the Calvo parameter in the intermediary sector is estimated to be as high as
0.94. Thus, even though the positive shock to technology shifts the supply curve of the firms to the
right, the price inertia causes the short-run supply curve to be almost horizontal, and thus the direct
supply-side eﬀect on output is small. Furthermore, a given level of production can now be reached
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using fewer production resources due to the higher level of productivity, causing employment as well
as capital demand to decrease. In turn, households wish to hold less capital stock and disinvest.
Thus, total demand for final goods has fallen, and in equilibrium this eﬀect dominates the positive
supply eﬀect, implying a lower output equilibrium than before the shock. Over time, however,
prices do fall because of the persistent technology shock that has decreased marginal costs, and
as demand responds to the lower prices, capital is accumulated and investments rise. A crucial
diﬀerence between the peg and the Taylor regime is the central bank’s reaction to such a shock;
under the peg the central bank keeps the interest rate virtually at the pre-shock level because the
exchange rate is nearly unaﬀected by the shock. Over time, however, domestic prices fall since
fewer resources are required to produce a given amount of goods; this drop in inflation trickers the
central bank under the Taylor regime to lower interest rates. While the response of investments
in the models is almost the same, we see that under a Taylor rule consumption initially benefits
from the lower interest rates (as the return of holding bonds has declined), thereby bringing total
demand into the positive region, ensuring a positive initial response in output.
In Figure 5 we inspect the consequences of an expansionary labour supply shock. The shock
represents a shift in the household’s relative valuation of consuming and enjoying leisure. Again
we observe that under the peg, output initially drops for the same reasons as stated for the tech-
nology shock. Responses in consumption to a labour supply shock are far more persistent than
the responses following a technology shock are for two reasons; first, the labour supply shock in
itself is more persistent than the technology shock is, and second, the labour supply shock changes
the relative valuation of consumption relative to leisure. For the same reasons, we also see that
persistence in labour responses increase compared to those of a technological shock.
Summarising, we found that three shocks are of great importance for the volatility in labour
supply; technology, monetary policy and labour supply shocks. While the response stemming from
technological shocks are almost identical in the two models, we just saw that labour supply shocks
contribute to generating an aggregated level of volatility in consumption and labour that is higher
under a Taylor rule than in the peg regime.
This is reverted, however, when studying expansive shocks to monetary policy, cf. Figure 6.
Under the peg, this experiment corresponds technically to shocking ξpegt , thereby devaluating et.
Since this shock is autocorrelated, et will remain undervalued compared to its parity for periods to
follow. The lower level of interest rates stimulates consumption as well as investments and output
rises. Under the Taylor rule the experiment is slightly diﬀerent; ξTRt is negatively shocked, and
initially this is expected to induce a fall in it. However, when the central bank lowers interest
rates households prefer to consume or hold foreign bonds instead of domestic ones; the first eﬀect
causes output to increase while the latter eﬀect puts pressure on the exchange rate and inflation
rises. The degree of price stickiness is very high, and therefore the central bank immediately reacts
by hiking interest rates since also distant future periods is weighted heavily. Additionally, the
increase in output causes the central bank to contract monetary policy; this endogenous response
in interest rates is larger than the exogenous response stemming from the shocks is, and therefore
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Figure 4: Responses to a technology shock (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
21
0 50
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
εL
0 50
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Y
0 50
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
C
0 50
−0.5
0
0.5
I
0 50
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Qd
0 50
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Qx
0 50
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Qm
0 50
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
K
0 50
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
L
0 50
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
W
0 50
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
i
0 50
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
R
0 50
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Pd
0 50
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
Px
0 50
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Pm
0 50
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
Π
Figure 5: Responses to a labour supply shock. (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
22
our experiment of performing an expansionary monetary policy shock results in initially rising
interest rates. For the same reason the responses in consumption and investments, and hence
output, are more muted than under the peg. In the short term, however, the economy benefits
from the expansionary eﬀects stemming from a devaluated exchange rate that is higher than under
the peg. We finally note that volatility in labour is higher under the peg than in the Taylor rule
regime, thereby contributing to the finding that labour is more volatile under the peg.
Finally, in Figure 7 we observe what happens following an exogenous shock to foreign interest
rates. Under the peg, the domestic central bank has to follow the direction of the foreign interest
rate movements in order to keep the exchange rate fixed. In the Taylor rule regime the central
bank hardly reacts as inflation as well as output is unaﬀected initially by the foreign interest rate
shock. For the same reason, only minor movements of all variables are observed in this case. Under
the peg, however, the higher level of interest rates dampens consumption as well as investments
causing aggregate output to fall. Again, we note that labour is more volatile under the peg, but
movements in the foreign interest rate are of less importance for movements in labour than are
technology, labour supply and monetary policy shocks.
7 Robustness and Alternative Scenarios
The previous section demonstrated that there are welfare gains from changing the monetary policy
from a fixed exchange rate to a Taylor rule. Recall, that the values of σmpeg and σ
m
TR quantify
the volatility of the policy errors under the two regimes. Considering the nature and scope of the
deregulated foreign-exchange market of today, one should generally find that the central bank’s
task of assigning the interest rate level that keeps the exchange rate exactly on target is nontrivial,
and thus a certain amount of policy errors seems unavoidable. Administering a Taylor rule with
fixed intervention dates and infrequent observations of the inflation and output gaps seems like a
manageable task in comparison. However, if it is possible for a central bank to obtain a credible
peg on a foreign currency, pressure on the exchange rate could plausibly fall to a level where the
peg can be maintained with a degree of precision comparable to that of a Taylor rule. Indeed, the
recent Danish experience has been one of a very stable exchange rate around the fixed parity, as
is evident from Figure 8. It turns out that varying the volatility of the policy shock in the range
spanned by the Taylor rule estimate of Smets and Wouters (2003) and that obtained for the Danish
peg regime in Dam and Linaa (2005) is of critical importance for the welfare results.
As described in Section 3 we are unable to estimate the volatility of ξTRt since this regime has
not been in eﬀect in Denmark. Instead we relied on the estimated volatility obtained by Smets and
Wouters (2003) as a proxy for “what to expect” if this monetary policy regime was introduced in
Denmark. In Figure 9 we show the welfare equivalences χ for varying values of σmTR.. For a value
of σmTR slightly above 0.005 we see that this compensation becomes negative meaning that if policy
errors under the Taylor rule lies above this level, a regime shift in monetary policy would result in
a welfare loss.
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Figure 6: Responses to a monetary policy shock. (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
24
0 50
0
0.5
1
i*
0 50
−4
−2
0
2
Y
0 50
−3
−2
−1
0
1
C
0 50
−15
−10
−5
0
5
I
0 50
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Qd
0 50
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Qx
0 50
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Qm
0 50
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
K
0 50
−6
−4
−2
0
2
L
0 50
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
W
0 50
−0.5
0
0.5
1
i
0 50
−6
−4
−2
0
2
R
0 50
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
Pd
0 50
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Px
0 50
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Pm
0 50
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Π
Figure 7: Responses to a foreign interest rate shock. (Peg: Solid lines, Taylor: Dashed lines)
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Figure 9: Welfare equivalence and monetary policy volatility
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We also turned this experiment on its head; we estimated an ar(1) for the exchange rate since
1999. As was seen from Figure 8, volatility in this period has been substantially reduced compared
to that of the full sample. This estimation resulted in an autocorrelation, (m, equal to 0.86, while
σmpeg was estimated to the value of 0.0008, equal to the value of σ
m
TR. Working with this process
decreased the benefits of adopting the Taylor rule, although it was still advisable, cf. Scenario i in
Table 4.
We also carried out two additional simulations of alternative scenarios as is seen from Table 4.
Scenario ii has already been described in Section 6 and it took the form of assuming labour supply
shocks were no more persistent than technology shocks. In this case (L was attached a value of 0.82
(equal to (t) and this reduced the compensation in consumption needed to put household utility
under the peg equal to utility in the Taylor rule regime to 0.27 pct.
Table 4: Welfare Analysis - Alternative Scenarios
Scenario 100× χ
i Lower exchange rate volatility
¡
σmpeg = 0.0008, (
m = 0.86
¢
0.660
ii Less persistent labour supply shock
¡
(L = 0.82
¢
0.277
iii Less nominal rigidity (d = D = 0.75) 1.149
Note: χ measures the compensating variation of consumption between the peg and
the optimal Taylor regime as defined in equation (??).
Scenario iii was assuming that prices were less rigid than they were estimated to be; postulating
both goods prices as well as wages can be reoptimised once a year increases the compensation that
equalises welfare between the two regimes to 1.15 pct. This is the result of two opposing sources;
on the one hand, when prices are extremely rigid, an inflation fighting central bank has only limited
possibilities to control inflation. This tends to reduce the benefits from leaving the peg and adopt
the Taylor rule. On the other hand, however, damages by not controlling inflation are more severe,
since they last longer. In this case the first source dominate.
The overall conclusion therefore seems to be that Denmark could potentially benefit from giving
up the peg and begin conducting monetary policy according to a Taylor rule. This change in the
monetary policy regime seems to be beneficial unless the policy error, σmTR, takes a substantially
larger value, than Smets and Wouters (2003) estimated as the value relevant for the euro-zone.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed the consequences of Denmark replacing the peg with a Taylor rule. For
this purpose we used the model laid out and estimated in Dam and Linaa (2005) in order to quantify
the welfare implications in the two regimes. We then dropped the assumption of the central bank
following a peg and replaced it with an assumption of the central bank conducting monetary policy
according to a Taylor rule.
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The models tell us that it is possible to increase the level of welfare by doing so; in fact we find
that the benefits can be summerised to 0.79 pct. measured in units of consumption goods. Various
alternative scenarios did not change this conclusion although the magnitude of change in welfare,
of course, was aﬀected by this. It turned out that welfare under the peg would only exceed welfare
in the Taylor regime if policy errors in the Taylor regime are far larger than those estimated for
the euro-zone by Smets and Wouters (2003).
Contrary to the related study in Kollmann (2002) we find that volatility of both consumption
and output increases when going from a peg to the Taylor rule; the main explanation for this was
the existence of a highly volatile and persistent labour supply shock. Reducing the persistence of
this shock puts us back to Kollmann’s scenario in which volatility is lower in the Taylor regime.
There are, however, potentially important matters not included in the above mentioned frame-
work. If Denmark decided to adopt a Taylor rule, risk aversion from foreign investors might induce
a reduction in direct investment flows into Denmark caused by an increased uncertainty regarding
the exchange rate. Furthermore, Danish exporters also face uncertainty regarding the exchange rate
and could need to engage in costly arrangements with financial intermediaries in order to eliminate
this uncertainty when trading with agents abroad. Finally, we ignore issues related to the potential
budget discipline being put on the Government in order to keep a peg credible.
Additionally, a number of obvious extensions of this work lies ahead: Firstly, we are currently
considering a more generalised form of the Taylor rule, examining the welfare gains attainable when
expanding the Taylor rule to include the exchange rate. We need more work on this issue however,
since we discovered a large range of spikes and ridges in the welfare levels derived from diﬀerent
parameterisations of the Taylor rule equipped with changes in the exchange rate. At this point
we are unable to explain this, but we will seek to get further insight into this area in our future
research. Secondly, we should examine the consequences of focusing on conditional moments rather
than using unconditional moments. This might be of great importance for the Danish case, since
we currently ignore the transition from from the peg regime to the Taylor rule regime.
This paper, however, contributes to the ongoing debate in Denmark whether to stick with the
peg, and it contributes to the literature in general by performing a welfare analysis on an estimated
small open economy dsge model with a number of nominal and real rigidities.
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A The Non-linear Model
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The processes governing the persistent structural shocks are given as
ζˆ
b
t = (
bζˆ
b
t−1 + ε
b
t , (50)
ζˆ
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t = (
lζˆ
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t−1 + ε
l
t, (51)
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t = (
m
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t , j = peg, TR (53)
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P Pˆ ∗t−1 + ε
P
t , (55)
Yˆ ∗t = (
Y Yˆ ∗t−1 + ε
Y
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where hats denote relative deviations from the steady state, and 0 < (j < 1, cf. Table 1.
Since, however, the monetary policy shock under the Taylor regime is assumed to be i.i.d., we have
(mTR = 0.
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Table 5: Variables and Parameters
Variables Exogenous Variables
Zt Final goods θt Technology level in intermediary sector
Pt Price of Z ζ
b
t Preference discount rate shock
Qit Intermediate goods ζ
l
t Labor supply shock
P it Price of Q
i υt uip shock
pit,τ Intermediary price optimized in period τ ξt Exchange-rate policy (peg) shock
Pit Price dispersion measure Y ∗t Foreign gdp
Yt gdp
¡
Qd +Qx
¢
P ∗t Foreign price level
Rt Rental rate of capital i∗t Foreign interest rate
MCt Marginal cost in intermediary sector
et Exchange rate
ρt,τ Discount factor between periods t and τ
Rt,τ Foreign discount factor Parameters (time invariant)
Ct Final consumption ν Net price markup (intermediaries)
Lt Aggregate labor supply γ Net wage markup
wt,τ Wage level optimized in period τ αd Share of Qd in final output
Wt Aggregate wage level ψ Capital share in intermediate goods
l t (s, j) Labor of type j supplied to firm s d Calvo parameter, intermediaries
Kt Capital stock β Utility discount factor
It Investment h Habit persistence
At Domestic bonds (0 in eqlm.) σ−1C Household ies
Bt Foreign bonds in foreign currency σ
−1
L Work eﬀort elasticity
it Domestic interest rate δ Capital depreciation rate
ift Return on Bt to domestic agents Φ Capital adjustment cost
Ωt Wedge between i∗t and i
f
t Ξ ss export in units of Z
χt Compound variable in wage eqtn. λ Debt premium on foreign bonds
UC,t Marginal utility of consumption D Calvo parameter, wages
UL,t Marginal disutility of labor η Export demand elasticity
N it Auxiliary variable (pit,t and wt,t)
Dit Auxiliary variable (pit,t and wt,t)
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